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To explore Chiara’s cognitive proposal, this article takes a phenomeno-
logical and interdisciplinary approach in an attempt to give insight 
into the experience of cognition and offer a basis for understanding it 
within the context of human development. The article outlines three 
modes of cognition that can be seen in human being using a schematic 
understanding of childhood development as a basis. These modes of 
cognition are then looked at from an evolutionary perspective seeing 
how human cognition, from the arrival of representational thought, 
has developed under the influence of culture more than of biology. This 
provides instruments for understanding the kind of cognition present 
in the text of “Look at All the Flowers,” showing its historical continu-
ity with other forms of cognition and indicating the significant new 
elements that it contains.
The importance of the act of knowing cannot be exagger-ated. Not only is it fundamental to human survival, it is also basic to every kind of human endeavour. Chiara 
Lubich offers a form of cognition that builds upon and develops 
previous forms and this is exemplified in the text “Look at all the 
Flowers.” To explore Chiara’s proposal, I shall take a phenomeno-
logical and interdisciplinary approach as this gives an insight into 
the experience of cognition and offers a basis for understanding 
it within the context of human development. What I will say is 
necessarily schematic and, of course, reality is more complex and 
less ordered. Nevertheless while such a brief study cannot pretend 
to give an exhaustive account, it may suggest a useful interpreta-
tive key. 
To begin with a definition: cognition, as I shall speak of it, is 
the way in which the human subject acquires and uses knowledge. It is 
thus never passive and merely receptive. It always exists in interac-
tion with reality and is always within the total context of what it 
is to be human, which means especially the relational dimension.
Three Modes of Cognition
Looking at how a child develops is, of course, not the only way of 
looking at human knowing. But it is a strategy for seeing some of 
the basic forms of cognition present in human beings.1 While each 
1. This kind of psychological approach can also be complemented by philosophical 
inquiries. For instance, Bernard Lonergan in Insight: A Study of Human Understanding 
(1957) proposed a “generalized empirical method” which he referred to as “critical real-
ism.” This approach is indebted to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas and, “fully cognisant 
of Hegel and Kant” (Brendan Purcell, From Big Bang to Big Mystery [Dublin: Veritas, 
2011], 246), it grounds knowing (and valuing) in a critique of the mind similar to 
Kant’s. Lonegan’s method could in principle be applied to any of the three proposed 
modes of cognition.
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mode of cognitive growth is in fact discernible once it has been 
achieved, in life the three modes are not discrete compartments 
and contain considerable variety and complexity.
Somatic or Enactive Knowledge
The first knowledge a child has of the world is through physical 
interactions with it: sucking, grasping, tasting, smelling, and so 
on. Jerome Bruner argues that while the initial form of action is 
“looking at,” these other actions allow the child to “objectify” and 
“correlate” the environment.2 Thus a cognitive model of the world 
is constructed through somatic interaction such that “Children 
first understand objects as extensions of their own bodies.”3 Quot-
ing Piaget, Bruner says things are “lived rather than thought.”4 The 
child, then, gradually learns not only to hold things, but to hold 
them in mind, forming representations or mental models that are 
either of something, or, as sensory motor skills develop, of how to do 
something (tying a knot for instance).5
2. Jerome Bruner, “On Cognitive Growth” in Bruner, Olver, Greenfield et al., Studies 
on Cognitive Growth (New York: Wiley, 1967), 16. Bruner, following Piaget (see Jean 
Piaget, Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood [New York: Norton, 1962]) develops 
a threefold classification of cognitive representation. This is the main source for the 
threefold schema set out here. As we shall see, it is largely similar to the work of schol-
ars in other fields.
3. Robert M. Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Bel-
nap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 18. Following Bruner, Bellah proposes 
three major modes of religious representation, in addition to another mode derived 
from religious experience, which he calls unitive events.
4. Jean Piaget, The Construction of Reality in Children (New York: Basic Books, 1954).
5. These are stored as contrasting and discrete kinds of memory, either of episodes that 
are recalled in their specifics or in procedures, as an abstraction from episodes, that 
are recalled as general behavioural patterns. Merlin Donald argues that there are two 
kinds of memory in early forms of cognitive development, episodic and procedural. 
“Whereas episodic memory preserves the specifics of events, procedural memory 
Symbolic Knowledge
Before complete linguistic mastery is achieved, another set of 
cognitive capacities begins to develop. These are ways of thinking 
about the world that represent it, with increasing competency, in 
symbolic forms: pictorially, musically, poetically, and narratively. 
They both communicate and make sense of experience, as Paul 
Ricoeur put it: “I express myself in expressing the world.”6 And, 
as such, they generate representations that the mind can use to 
model reality to itself and that can also create cultural artifacts 
(paintings, music, poems, stories) conveying these models to oth-
ers. They are extremely powerful, and each in its own way contains 
meanings that cannot be fully captured by concepts.7 This excess of 
content is present in all forms of symbolic expression, but narra-
tive is capable of explaining intent, motivation, feelings, personal 
value, and individual and collective identity. Each person or com-
munity is, as it were, the story about the self or the community.
preserves general principles for action, across events. Procedural memories must pre-
serve general principles for action and ignore the specifics of each situation.” Merlin 
Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution of Culture and Cogni-
tion (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard, 1991), 150. Fascinatingly these two kinds of 
memory are stored in different parts of the brain (see ibid.). 
6. Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 13.
7. Susanne Langer says, “Artistic symbols .  .  . are untranslatable; their sense .  .  . is 
always implicit, and cannot be explicated by any interpretation. This is true even of 
poetry, for though the material of poetry is verbal, its import is not the literal assertion 
made in the words, but the way the assertion is made, and this involves the sound, the 
tempo, the aura of associations of the words, the long or short sequences of ideas, the 
wealth or poverty of transient imagery that contains them, the sudden arrest of fan-
tasy by pure fact, or of familiar fact by sudden fantasy, the suspense of literal meaning 
by a sustained ambiguity resolved in a long- awaited key- word, and the unifying, all- 
embracing artifice of rhythm.” Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (New York: 
Penguin, 1948), 212.
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Theoretic Knowledge
From about the age of seven, though not at the same time for all 
children, conceptual thought begins to emerge. This marks the end 
of what Piaget calls an “egocentric world” where, since the world 
and the child are not distinct, all things are understood to happen 
in relation to and as an extension of the child:8 the self and other 
things are now independent elements in the world. This leads to a 
greater capacity to objectify the world and, with that, the capacity 
to think abstractly. This is the basis for theoretical thought. 
These three modes of knowing have in common several funda-
mental aspects. Three are significant in our context. Each models 
the world around it, forming a mental pattern of its knowledge of 
the environment that is used to interact with it. Each is part of a 
network of relationships with other human subjects in the forma-
tion of these mental models, that is, we know as part of a commu-
nity of knowledge.9 And each forms representations (via gestures, 
8. Piaget held a strong view of what, to use Lucien Lévy- Brühl’s term, could be called 
the child’s participation mystique with the world. Robert Bellah, however, notes: “On 
the basis of recent research, Piaget’s notion of adualism must be qualified, or even 
perhaps, applied only to the period before birth. George Butterworth has argued that 
‘a boundary exists in infant perception between infant and the world such that the ab-
solute adualism assumed by Piaget is not supported.’ But he adds, ‘On the other hand, 
it is clear that the very young infant has no objective, reflective self- awareness.’ George 
Butterworth, ‘Some Benefits of Egocentrism,’ in Making Sense: The Child’s Construction 
of the World, ed. Jerome Bruner and Helen Haste (London: Methuen, 1987), 70–71.” 
Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution, 614, note 21.
9. Bruner argues that there are two tenets to what he calls the “instrumental concep-
tualism” that he and his colleagues propose. The first is that “our knowledge of the 
world is based on a constructed model of reality, a model that can only partially and 
intermittently be tested against input.” (Bruner, Studies in Cognitive Growth, 319) He 
goes on to say, secondly, that the models contained in this constructed model of reality 
“develop as a function of the uses to which they have been first put by the culture and 
then by any of its members who must bend knowledge to their own uses” (Ibid., 320).
symbols, or theories) which give access to these models, allowing 
them to be developed, challenged, and communicated.
The Evolution of Human Cognition
The three modes of cognitive development suggest ways of un-
derstanding the gradual development of human cognition and the 
culture that accompanies it. Merlin Donald, for instance, posits 
three stages of cognitive evolution, developing out of pre- human 
cognitive processes similar to those of the great apes, which gener-
ate what he calls “episodic culture.”10 This is followed by the tran-
sition to early hominid “mimetic culture,” made up of gestures 
and pre- linguistic vocalizations. Archaeological and anthropo-
logical evidence suggest that as brain size grew and body structure 
altered, from homo habilis to homo erectus, new skills were being 
acquired. These show the development of new cognitive abilities 
in the emergent hominids. Enactment, for example, in the form 
of mime, can teach how to produce a stone axe, and this implies a 
mental model not only of what is to be produced but of the proce-
dure to produce it.11 It is not certain at what point this culture gave 
place to one where mental models were represented by meaningful 
and syntactically ordered sounds. In homo erectus changes in the 
vocal tract suggest at least the possibility that this species may even 
have developed language.12
Nevertheless, with the advent of homo sapiens a cognitive tran-
sition has clearly taken place and it is possible to discern in the cul-




12. For a wide- ranging discussion see Purcell, 197–206.
23C LAR ITAS | Journal of Dialogue & Culture | Vol. 2, No. 2 (October 2013) 
uses symbols with semantic content, namely “mythic culture.”13 
In his careful study of human origins and development, Brendan 
Purcell maintains that it is very likely that what is variously de-
scribed as a “creative explosion” or a “human revolution” did in-
deed take place with the arrival of “intentional symbolic activity,”14 
and it would seem that its origins go back as far as about 164,000 
years ago in Africa. At this point, cognitive development begins 
to be dominated not so much by biological as cultural change. 
Mythic culture employs symbolic representations in the context 
of narratives (mythos is Greek for story), and these give human 
subjects powerful instruments to interpret and interact with the 
environment.15 Mythic cognition is not static and it did progress, 
using its narrative and symbolic methodology, to be self- critical.16
This self- criticism became acute in a further transition that 
took place in several cultures, in particular Greece, ancient Israel, 
Persia, India, and China, during what Karl Jaspers called the axial 
13. Evidence of this continues to be found. In Europe, some of the most impressive 
creations can be seen, for instance, in the oldest cave paintings currently known at 
Altamira in Spain. The most ancient of them is a red disk dated at before 4800 BCE, 
considerably older than the Chauvet paintings in France dated as at least 3700 BCE. 
The artistry at both sites is superb, demonstrating a complex of skills and also strongly 
suggesting a socially advanced culture where people could be set aside to develop 
their artistic talents. See: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2012/06/120614 
- neanderthal- cave- paintings- spain- science- pike/
14. Purcell, 181.
15. The power of story should never be underestimated. One can return again and 
again to a story, especially if it is a good one, and it will render new insights. Mythic 
thinking, therefore, can do things that conceptual thought cannot.
16. An example is the first chapter of Genesis, where a story of the one God creating 
the world he utterly transcends was critical of polytheistic accounts.
period.17 The culture that emerged, which we are heir to today,18 
can be called, in the pregnant expression of Giuseppe Zanghì, the 
culture of the logos.19 The logos is a form of knowing that attempts 
to achieve objectivity, that is, to see things without projections 
from the hopes, fears, fantasies, or preconditioning of the subject. 
It develops conceptual reasoning that produces theories, and so it 
corresponds to the acquisition of theoretical knowledge. But the 
logos- word can also be a word of command and so have ethical and 
existential implications. Furthermore, as the light of understand-
ing it can also mean conscience or a profound spiritual intuition, 
which attempts to see things as they truly are.20 As such it is the 
17. Jaspers proposed the notion of an axial period in 1949 in his Vom Ursprung und Ziel 
der Geschichte (The Origin and Goal of History). He sees it as having taken place “from 
800 and 200 BC” (The Origin and Goal of History, trans. from German by Michael 
Bullock [London: Routledge, 2011], 23). Others date it slightly differently; Mormi-
gliano, for instance, puts the axial period in “the classical situation of the ancient world 
between 600 and 300 BC” (Arnaldo Mormigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hel-
lenization [Cambridge: CUP, 1975], 8). The idea of the axial period has been further 
developed by Eric Voegelin, who speaks of “multiple and parallel leaps in being” in 
the first millennium BCE, in Order and History, 5 vols (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1956–1987) and by Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt in “Introduction: The 
Axial Age Breakthroughs—Their Characteristics and Origins” in The Origins and Di-
versity of the Axial Age, ed. S. N. Eisenstadt (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986).
18. Karen Armstrong, however, argues that a new axial period took place during the 
enlightenment in The Great Transformation (London: Atlantic Books, 2007). Others 
say that the modern age displays the characteristics of a new axial period; see Yves 
Lambert, “Religion in Modernity as a New Axial Age: Secularization or New Reli-
gious Forms?” in Sociology of Religion 60 (1999): 303–333.
19. See Giuseppe M. Zanghì, “Quale uomo per il terzo millennio?” in Nuova Umanità 
XXIII (2001): 247–277 and “Il pensare come amore: Verso un nuovo paradigma cul-
turale” in Nuova Umanità XXV (2003): 1–19.
20. It is impossible not to recall the logos in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel which 
is said to be “The true light, which enlightens everyone” ( Jn 1:9; see also Jn 1:4).
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capacity to engage in what Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt calls “reflex-
ivity,” that is, examining one’s own assumptions.21 In Greece, for 
example, this was undertaken by theoretical discourse in the de-
velopment of philosophy; the ethical- existential dimension was 
developed in the light of Transcendence by the Hebrew prophets; 
a transcendent spiritual intuition (bodhi) was at the root of the new 
conceptual thinking that arose with Buddhism. These are three 
instances of a cultural shift that privileged a form of cognition that 
challenged, radicalized, and went beyond mythic thought—not 
that mythic thought disappeared or lost its intrinsic value, but it 
was reformulated in logos culture.22
The axial period had a number emblematic figures: Plato, Isa-
iah, Buddha, Confucius, Lao Tzu, for instance. Jesus, who is so 
important for Chiara’s life and thought, was outside the axial pe-
riod as usually defined. Nonetheless, what he brought or, perhaps 
better in this context, the culture that came about as a result of him, 
while being a development of the Hebrew axial breakthrough, was 
rooted in a transcendent spiritual intuition that critiqued the cul-
ture from which it developed and laid the basis for a culture that, 
in dialogue with Greek philosophy, tended to privilege theoretical 
discourse. As Chiara shows, however, Jesus was more than just a 
synthesis of what arose with logos culture.23
21. See Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, “Introduction: The Axial Age Breakthroughs.”
22. Nothing is ever lost. Somatic forms of cognition also remain, though reformulated 
in the light of later cognitive evolutions.
23. Indeed, Giuseppe Zanghì says, “I have called this cultural paradigm: ‘logos,’ think-
ing specifically of the Logos of God. He is, in the Trinity, the one who stands before 
the Father, before God, revealing him in himself- Word, in himself- Logos, to be the 
power that that does not repressively hold on to the other but that distinguishes itself 
from the other: the Father as Love.” (“Il pensare come amore,” 9). (Translation mine.)
Chiara Lubich’s Cognitive Proposal
As cognition acquires further capacities, so the relationship of the 
subject to the known changes. In somatic knowing, present in mi-
metic culture, the subject sees itself as part of its environment, 
with only a very limited sense of its distinction from it. A crucial 
development of selfhood comes with the emergence of symbolic 
cognition and mythic culture, since the subject becomes aware of 
the difference between its group and the environment. Nonethe-
less, here the subject, while it may be aware of its distinction from 
the group, functions almost exclusively as a member of the group.24 
It thinks in traditional ways, according to symbols and stories that 
have been handed down. The great acquisition of logos culture is 
awareness of individual selfhood, even at the risk of losing aware-
ness of the subject’s participation in its human and natural envi-
ronments. It is the “objective” stance given by this perception that 
gives the human subject the acute reflexivity that makes it capable 
of constructing conceptual theories as mental models to interpret 
and interact with reality.
Chiara, applying in an original way Jesus’ synthesis and chal-
lenge to logos culture, proposes a different kind of subjectivity. 
The individual remains but it is now in a relationship of profound 
mutual involvement with other individuals, a form of recollection 
both within self and within the other person insofar as empathy, 
24. Giuseppe Zanghì says, “In mythic culture, who is the thinking subject? It cannot be 
the individual as such (the individual is always a ‘laceration’ of the whole): it is ‘the 
group,’ with which the individual is identified. And the unity of the group preserves 
the unity of the Beginning: it is the group which preserves the individual in the divine, 
in the Origin” (ibid., 4) and “Mythic culture is fundamentally memory of the original 
unity but wounded by the painful perception of having in some way lost that place” 
(ibid., 5). (Both translations mine.)
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sensitivity, and attentive listening and communication (the apo-
theosis of the logos- word) will allow: “Yes, you should always rec-
ollect yourself also in the presence of a brother or sister, but not 
avoiding the created person, rather recollecting him or her within 
your own Heaven and recollecting yourself in the Heaven of the 
other.”
In this context one’s individual mental models are challenged, 
broadened, and deepened by contact with the other. While this 
builds upon the cultural and relational dimension of all cognition, 
it demands a greater detachment from all mental models than is 
the case with any of the three modes. In relation to the other per-
son, everything can be reframed or rethought; even hard- won the-
ories cannot be defended by the ego that generated them. Gesture, 
symbol, theory are all offered, not imposed, within the context of a 
deep meeting. In this way it is the very social nature of this process 
that offers the participants an intensified reflexivity, an extra pos-
sibility of using critical reasoning to challenge their presupposi-
tions. Ideas are seen as instruments of a mutual reflection, engaged 
in together, so that out of the meeting of persons emerges a new 
act of cognition, one based on but not bound by any of the previ-
ous mental models. It thus has creative potential and is capable of 
thinking thoughts not had before in an act of cognition that is not 
closed and which, at least in principle, can be developed in further 
encounters.
The key to stopping this from becoming a constant change 
with no fixed points is its openness to transcendence. There is a 
recognition by all parties that “truth” lies not only in the partial 
perceptions of individuals, but also beyond them. Dialogue is, in 
fact, trialogue. It is possible, therefore, to perceive things that have 
validity outside of, or not dependent upon, the act of cognition it-
self. In their mutual openness generated by love, individuals begin 
to discover another vision. It is what Chiara calls: “Jesus’ vision, of 
Jesus who, besides being head of the Mystical Body, is everything: 
all the Light, the Word, while in the Word we are words.”
Indeed, in the experience described by “Look at All the Flow-
ers,” this vision is lived as an opening up to a transcendent expe-
rience25 that is a radicalization of the logos as spiritual intuition, 
hence the apt language of “recollection.” It is, furthermore, also 
fully able to use the various forms of somatic, symbolic, and theo-
retical representation (as shown, for instance, in the text “Look at 
All the Flowers” itself). What these modes now provide, however, 
is more than simply enhanced models. Rather, they convey a sapi-
ential reading of reality: “. . . and the Light that you have given me 
I have given them.”26 This sapiential reading opens up cognitive 
25. The transcendent experiences of the axial period were manifold. With various in-
tents, various taxonomies of mystical, numinous or spiritual experience have been es-
sayed, starting from William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in 
Human Nature (London: Longmans, first published 1902); and going to other seminal 
texts such as Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (Oxford: OUP, 1923), first published as 
Das Heilige in 1917; or the work of Robert Charles Zaehner, especially Mysticism: Sa-
cred and Profane (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957); or of Walter T. Stace, especially Mys-
ticism and Philosophy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1960); and more recently Louis 
Roy, Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique (Toronto: Toronto Univer-
sity Press, 2001). While different theories can be constructed to relate such experiences 
to one another and bring them to form a consistent whole, phenomenologically they 
are distinctive. Using a term like “transcendent experience” does not prejudge their 
interpretation or presuppose any particular classification.
26. This is how Chiara quotes Jn 17:22. In fact the text from the Fourth Gospel does 
not use the word “light,” but doxan (glory). It is significant because Chiara, in follow-
ing the Vulgate’s Et ego claritatem, quam dedisti mihi, dedi eis is highlighting the cogni-
tive aspect of glory. 
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possibilities beyond the strictly religious or spiritual realm.27 Meet-
ing together in a shared transcendent experience, the human sub-
jects both feel themselves united with Jesus and find that they are 
seeing things (nature, humanity, indeed all creation), as it were, 
from Jesus.
Chiara’s cognitive proposal, therefore, is in continuity with 
other forms of human cognition, especially as related to non- 
biological change. But, following Jesus, it radicalizes the cognitive 
forms of logos culture. In doing so it also reframes the context of 
symbolic and somatic cognition, making them also vehicles of sa-
piential discourse.
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27. Giuseppe Zanghì puts it thus, “It is Jesus, then: the reality thought cannot but be 
Jesus, the man- God (let us recall St. Bonaventure and his reductio artium ad theolo-
giam!). That Jesus in whom all is recapitulated (see Eph. 1:10). That Jesus in whom the 
human—every human—and the divine—with all its infinite riches—are One” (“Il 
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